Abstract
This article analyzes the ontological and metaphysical position of Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī in his work al-Tasdīd, particularly his view that the Creator is not composed of substance, accident, or matter. The study explores al-Sighnāqī’s classification of beings based on their temporal origin and continuity, emphasizing his rational arguments for the eternal and uncreated nature of God. It further examines the structure of created existence – substance and accident – by comparing classical kalām with modern scientific concepts from Plato, Democritus, and Einstein. The article discusses the nature of substance and its inherent accidents (motion or rest), revealing how created entities are temporally originated (ḥādith) and subject to change. Through this, al-Sighnāqī’s theological reasoning establishes the ontological distinction between the Eternal Creator (Qadīm) and contingent beings. The study highlights the relevance of Islamic metaphysical doctrines in contemporary philosophical and scientific discourse.


